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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
Our criminal justice system is bottomed on several 
unwavering principles. One of those principles was 
recognized long ago by Justice Sutherland when he stated 
that a prosecuting attorney 
 
       is the representative not of an or dinary party to a 
       controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
       govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
       govern at all; and whose interest, ther efore, in a 
       criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
       that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar 
       and very definite sense the servant of the law, the 
       twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
       innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness 
       and vigor--indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
       strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
       ones. It is as much his duty to refrain fr om improper 
       methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction 
       as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
       just one. 
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Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935), 
overruled on other grounds, Stir one v. United States, 361 





John William Dunn inflicted grievous injuries on his 
infant son. In exchange for his plea of nolo contendere, the 
prosecutor promised, among other things, to recommend a 
minimum sentence within the standard guideline range of 
36-60 months. At sentencing, however, the pr osecutor did 
not mention the standard guideline range, much less a 
minimum sentence within that range, arguing instead that 
while she could not ask the Court to impose the"maximum 
possible penalty," "a lengthy term of incarceration is 
necessary" -- a "penalty that's considerable." Dunn was 
sentenced to seven and one-half to twenty years 
imprisonment. He argues, and we agree, that the 
prosecutor did not adhere to the ter ms of the bargain she 
struck with him. We further find that the state court 
unreasonably applied clearly established Supr eme Court 
caselaw, and that the District Court erred in concluding 
otherwise. Accordingly, we will reverse. 
 
Dunn was charged with aggravated assault, simple 
assault, reckless endangerment and endangering the 
welfare of a child stemming from his February 10, 1992 
assault on his two month-old son, John. On that day, 
Dunn was left to care for his son while his wife was at 
work. When Mrs. Dunn returned home in the evening, she 
found her son moaning, rigid and non-responsive. The 
infant's head was limply hanging down and to the right, 
and his eyes were half-closed. When pressed as to what 
happened, Dunn became angry and when he lear ned his 
wife had called the pediatrician, he became enraged and 
shattered a living room window. He initially refused to drive 
Mrs. Dunn and his son to the pediatrician's office, 
acquiescing only when she threatened to call a lawyer. 
 
After examining the infant, the pediatrician immediately 
admitted him to the hospital. The next day, Dunn admitted 
to Detective Dean Schwartz that his son had been crying 
 
                                3 
  
and that Dunn had "lost it," became frustrated, and 
"started to strike the child harder and har der and harder." 
A471. He said that after he struck his son, he wrapped him 
in a blanket, put him in his crib, let him cry for hours, and 
never sought medical treatment. In what can only be 
described as a massive understatement, he posited that 
perhaps he was not the best person to watch a sick infant 
because he was a recovering alcoholic. 
 
The infant was diagnosed with shaken baby syndr ome 
and remains severely disabled to this day. At the time of 
sentencing, Mrs. Dunn testified that her then-fifteen month 
old son requires continual nursing car e at home because 
he suffers seizures, cannot see, is in tr emendous pain, is 
fed through a gastrointestinal tube, vomits all the time, is 
at constant risk of aspirating on his own mucous, has his 
blood drawn constantly, cries for several hours at a time, 
and is unable to grab for a toy, sit up, roll-over or even 
reach for his mother. At that time, it was expected that 
death was imminent. Despite the grave prognosis, John 
Dunn is now 8 years old, with permanent brain damage 
and facing numerous surgeries. 
 
Dunn was released on bail shortly after his arr est and 
filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statement. 
Pursuant to an unwritten plea agreement and, 
coincidentally, on the one-year anniversary of the assault, 
Dunn withdrew that motion and pleaded nolo contendere to 
aggravated assault and endangering the welfar e of a child. 
That agreement was described at the plea hearing in the 
following colloquy between the prosecutor and the Court: 
 
       [Prosecutor] . . . There is an agreement of sorts 
       in this case, Judge. 
 
        The Commonwealth is going to 
       be requesting the Court impose 
       consecutive sentences on the two 
       counts, as they do not merge. 
       However, I'd like for the sentencing 
       in the endangering to be a 
       consecutive term of probation, so 
       that after any parol [sic] 
       supervision is terminated, we have 
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       an extra period of supervision on 
       this defendant. 
 
       Court: All right. It's my understanding, 
       Mr. Dunn -- 
 
       [Prosecutor] Judge, there's one more thing. The 
       Commonwealth is recommending 
       a minimum in this case on Count 
       1 within the standard range, 
       standard guidelines range, but 
       that is not binding on the Court. 
 
A460-A461. The Court later explained to Dunn: 
 
       Court: Now, what is not binding on the 
       Court and is left totally to the 
       discretion of the Court as far as 
       sentencing, the Commonwealth 
       indicates that they will 
       recommend consecutive sentences. 
       There will be a recommendation of 
       a sentence of a minimum which 
       would be in the standard range, 
       and that the second, the 
       endangering the welfare of 
       children, would be a sentence of 
       probation. However, that is not 
       binding on the Court in any way. 
       That is something which is 
       entirely up to the Court, that your 
       counsel has indicated -- 
 
       [Defense Attorney]: Judge, if I could just interrupt. 
       That isn't what the plea bargain is. 
       The probation on the consecutive 
       on the endangering is binding. 
 
       Court: Is that binding? 
 
       [Prosecutor] Yes, Judge, I'd like to see some 
       extended supervision of this 
       defendant after any kind of jail 
       and parole supervision. 
 
                                5 
  
       Court: What you're saying is that the 
       Commonwealth is requesting, but 
       you said it wasn't binding. 
 
       [Prosecutor] Judge, the sentence as to Count 1, 
       aggravated assault, is there -- 
       there is a non-binding 
       recommendation. As to Count 4, 
       I'd like to see [a] binding 
       recommendation to probation 
       because I would like to ensure 
       extended supervision. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       Court: All right. 
       Now, let's go through that again so 
       there's no misunderstanding here. 
       As I indicated, a plea of nolo 
       contendere to Count 1 and count 
       4. The aggravated assault and the 
       endangering the welfare of 
       children, that the other two counts 
       would be withdrawn. Likewise, 
       binding on the Court would be 
       that it would be a consecutive 
       sentence, the second sentence 
       being the endangering the welfare 
       of children, and binding on the 
       court would be that it be a 
       sentence of probation on that 
       charge. Now, if we were not to 
       accept that binding agreement 
       which we have not participated in, 
       then you would have a right to 
       withdraw your plea of guilty. 
 
        Now, the Commonwealth has 
       recommended, but it is not 
       binding on the Court, that on the 
       charge of aggravated assault that 
       the sentence be -- that the 
       minimum sentence be in the 
       standard range of sentencing. 
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       However, as your counsel 
       indicated, it's not binding, and the 
       sentence could be less than that 
       and likewise, it could be even 
       more. Do you understand that? 
 




Dunn was sentenced on April 8, 1993. At the beginning 
of the sentencing proceeding, the contours of the plea 
agreement were again articulated by the sentencing judge 
who clearly understood what -- at least at that point in 
time -- the Commonwealth's recommendation was expected 
to be. 
 
       Court: At the time of the entry of the 
       plea, there was a plea bargain 
       arrangement that the counts of 
       recklessly endangering another 
       person and the simple assault 
       would be withdrawn. The 
       Commonwealth also indicated that 
       they would recommend a 
       minimum sentence in the 
       standard range, although this was 
       not binding on the Court. In this 
       instance, the range would be 36 to 
       60 months. So it was the 
       Commonwealth's recommendation 
       that the minimum sentence be in 
       that range, but that it was not, as 
       I indicated, not binding on the 
       Court. There was a binding 
       agreement that the sentence on 
       Count 4 run consecutive. 
       However, that was to be a 
       sentence of probation which was 
       binding on this Court if the Court 
       would accept the plea bargain 
       arrangement. 
 
        [To the Prosecutor] is that your 
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       understanding of the plea 
       agreement? 
 
       [Prosecutor] Yes, your Honor . 
 
       Court: [To Defense Attorney] is that your 
       understanding of the plea 
       agreement? 
 




The Court then heard testimony from a number of 
witnesses. For the Commonwealth, Mrs. Dunn testified that 
Dunn had a drug problem before they wer e married, had a 
drinking problem throughout their marriage, and was often 
physically abusive towards her. She also confirmed that 
prior to the February 10th incident, she told Dunn never to 
"shake a baby vigorously, because it can cause severe brain 
damage." Detective Schwartz told the Court that he 
disagreed with the Commonwealth's recommended sentence 
and recommended that Dunn be imprisoned for at least five 
years and as much as the legal maximum -- "the steepest 
that the Court can give is what I recommend. It's just an 
unbelievable case." A419. 
 
On Dunn's behalf, his sister testified that Dunn needed 
to come to terms with what he did to his son as well as deal 
with his emotional and substance abuse problems. The 
chaplain at the Allentown Rescue Mission, wher e Dunn 
lived for some time during the pendency of his case, 
testified that although Dunn was cooperative while living at 
the Mission, he was emotionally troubled, depr essed and 
suicidal. The chaplain attributed Dunn's emotional trouble 
to his stint in the United States Army and the death of his 
father. With respect to the assault on the infant, the 
chaplain indicated that Dunn did not understand how 
patting his son on the back to raise a burp could have 
caused severe brain damage. Another employee of the 
Rescue Mission also testified that Dunn was emotionally 
troubled. He said that Dunn still believed that his pats on 
his son's back did not cause the infant's sever e brain 
damage and regretted not having the r esources to prove 
that at trial. 
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Finally, Dunn testified that he did not know at the time 
that his son was injured. Indeed, he continued, he 
remained mystified that patting his son on the back could 
have caused such severe brain damage without leaving so 
much as a bruise. Dunn conceded his problems with drugs 
and alcohol as well as his unresolved feelings about his 
father's death and hoped that he might one day live a 
normal life. 
 
After hearing this testimony, the Court called upon 
counsel: 
 
       Court: Do Counsel wish to say anything 
       further? 
 
       [Prosecutor] Yes, Judge. I answer your question 
       yes and I don't even know what to 
       say, Judge. What I know is, I know 
       the injuries of the child. I know the 
       loss to the family. What I know is the 
       reasons for this plea. I think it's 
       pretty clear that I wanted to resolve 
       this in a plea. I didn't want these 
       parties, particularly, I didn't want 
       Grace [the mother of the infant] to go 
       through trial, testimony, the 
       possibility of any kind of verdict as 
       the result of a trial. I wanted to be 
       able to have this situation put behind 
       everyone. 
 
        On the other hand, Judge, there is 
       so much that I feel about this 
       situation. I feel that we've heard a 
       carload of excuses for his behavior, or 
       for his condition, meaning the 
       defendant. I don't believe that the 
       acts that occurred that Monday were 
       intentional. Yet the statute read[s] 
       reckless. And by this reckless 
       conduct, this child will never have a 
       life. This mother will face a possibility 
       of losing her child some day, 
       prematurely, to say the least. She 
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       suffers with this child everyday, 
       Judge, in a way that no one should 
       ever have to suffer; watching a child 
       in constant pain and discomfort. 
 
        And I have not heard, nor read 
       anything, either in this proceeding, or 
       in this presentence investigation, 
       that demonstrates to me that 
       this defendant has even the 
       most remote understanding or 
       compassion for that. All we hear 
       about is him. I've not heard much 
       about his concern for the child, his 
       concern for their condition. You 
       heard Grace talk about the fact that 
       she is the sole support, now, for 
       herself and her child. The medical 
       situation worsens, the insurance 
       situation worsens. And there's not 
       much care on the part of the 
       defendant. 
 
        I've heard, ironically, this excuse. I 
       don't mean to minimize it, everyone 
       has problems, that perhaps the death 
       of his father plays in who he is. And 
       all I can think of is, isn't it ironic that 
       here was the opportunity for this 
       man to have his own son and to 
       establish a different kind of 
       father/son relationship. And that's 
       totally ruined and impossible. And so 
       I don't know that I can accept the 
       relationship of a father and a son as 
       an excuse for destroying another 
       relationship between a father and a 
       son. 
 
        I can't ask you to impose the 
       maximum possible penalty. That 
       would go outside of what my initial 
       recommendation was. And I think if I 
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       would have a chance to sit down and 
       have a drink of water and calm 
       myself, maybe I would even think 
       that to ask for the absolute maximum 
       is unjust. But I believe this was 
       reckless conduct. Unfortunately, it 
       resulted in irreparable devastation. 
       But I think a lengthy term of 
       incarceration is necessary to address 
       what happened here, to get this 
       man's attention, to get his focus in 
       line, as to what he has to do, what he 
       did do, what he needs to do to move 
       on with his life. And maybe to give 
       this woman just five minutes of peace 
       of mind. . . . 
 
        I think that all of these parties have 
       spoken from the heart, Judge, and I 
       wouldn't want to be in your shoes for 
       all the tea in China. But I think that 
       something has to be done. It's 
       unfortunate that I didn't hear 
       remorse. I heard remorse for one's 
       own situation, one's own future. But 
       I didn't hear remorse for what 
       happened here. And I can't abide by 
       that. And I'm very sorry that I didn't 
       hear that. And I would ask that you 
       consider, Judge, a penalty that's 
       considerable and one that will 
       hopefully move this defendant's 
       behavior in line with what we find 
       socially acceptable, because this is 
       not. 
 
A143-A146. The Court then sentenced Dunn on the 
aggravated assault charge to not less than seven and one- 
half years and not more than twenty years to be served in 
a correctional institution designated by the Deputy 
Commissioner for Treatment. On the endangering count, 
Dunn was sentenced to a consecutive term offive years' 
probation. The Court explained that the sentence exceeded 
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the guidelines because of Dunn's violent past, the especially 
heinous nature of the crime, Dunn's failur e to seek medical 
assistance after the incident, and the prognosis that the 
infant would have a limited life. 
 
Dunn thereafter filed a petition for post-conviction 
collateral relief challenging, among other things, his 
counsel's failure to object to or seek a r emedy for the 
prosecutor's breach of the plea agr eement at sentencing. In 
denying the petition, the Court explained that the 
Commonwealth was obligated only to recommend a non- 
binding sentence in the standard range. The Court stated 
that it was well aware of the Commonwealth's 
recommendation and that the prosecutor's r equest for a 
"lengthy" period of incarceration was consistent with the 
plea agreement because a sentence within the standard 
range was, indeed, lengthy. 
 
Dunn appealed from the order denying his petition. The 
Superior Court affirmed, and found, as r elevant here, as 
follows: 
 
       Initially, we note that a sentence in the standar d range 
       of the guidelines, as set forth at sentencing by the 
       court, would have called for a term of imprisonment of 
       three to five years imprisonment. This ter m can be 
       viewed as "lengthy" in and of itself. Thus, by 
       recommending a "lengthy" term of imprisonment the 
       district attorney did not violate the ter ms of the plea 
       agreement. Furthermore, three sentences before the 
       contested remark, the district attorney stated, "I can't 
       ask you to impose the maximum possible penalty. That 
       would go outside of what my initial recommendation 
       was." Thus, the district attorney clearly qualified the 
       contested remark by indicating his [sic] 
       recommendation was still intact. 
 
A273-A274 (internal citation omitted). The Court further 
found that there was no prejudice because the sentencing 
court was well aware of the Commonwealth's 
recommendation. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
denied review. 
 
Dunn filed a timely petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 2254 
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
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Pennsylvania again challenging the prosecutor's conduct at 
sentencing. Adopting the report and recommendation of the 
Magistrate Judge, the District Court concluded that 
because the plea agreement permitted the Commonwealth 
to recommend a minimum sentence of between 36 and 60 
months and such a sentence was "lengthy" compared to the 
mean minimum sentence imposed for aggravated assault, 
the prosecutor's request for a "lengthy" sentence did not 
breach the agreement. Finding, however , that this 
conclusion was "by no means free from doubt," the District 




It is wholly understandable that the prosecutor was 
exasperated if not outraged following Dunn's pr esentation 
at sentencing, a presentation which evidenced his utter 
failure to accept responsibility for the savagery he inflicted 
on his infant son. Indeed, we have felt those same emotions 
in similar circumstances. And while we accept the 
prosecutor's representation that her statements at 
sentencing were not motivated by ill will, the motive of the 
prosecutor is of no moment because it is the br each and 
not the intent behind the breach which causes the error. 
We, therefore, move to the only issue before us: whether the 
state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal 
law when it determined that the prosecutor did not breach 
the plea agreement.1 
 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), P .L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214, which "placed a new restriction on the power of 
federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state 
prisoners." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Dunn raises a number of other challenges to his conviction. Because 
he never requested nor received a certificate of appealability as to those 
issues, we address only the question of whether habeas relief should 
issue if the Commonwealth breached its plea agr eement. 3d Cir. 
LAR22.1(b) ("If the district court grants a certificate of appealability 
as to 
only some issues, the court of appeals will not consider uncertified 
issues unless petitioner first seeks, and the court of appeals grants 
certification of additional issues.") 
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(Opinion of O'Connor, J.). Because Dunn filed his habeas 
petition after the effective date of the AEDP A, we are 
required to apply that statute's r equirements. Predominant 
among them is the requirement that federal courts give 
greater deference than before to factual findings and legal 
determinations of the state courts, with federal habeas 
corpus relief to be granted only if the state court 
adjudication 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
       Court of the United States; or 
 
       (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
       unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
       evidence presented in the State court pr oceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. SS 2254(d)(1) and (2).2  
 
In Williams, the Supreme Court held that under the 
"contrary to" prong of 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue if the 
state court came to a legal conclusion opposite to that 
reached by the Supreme Court, or if the state court decided 
a case differently than the Supreme Court has on 
"materially indistinguishable facts." W illiams, 529 U.S. at 
412-413; see also Werts v. Vaughn , 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d 
Cir. 2000). The Court also held that under the latter prong 
of 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue if the state court identified 
the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably 
applied that principle. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413. To 
make such a finding, the habeas court must deter mine 
"whether the state court's application of clearly established 
federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409; see 
also Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 2120 (2000). As 
we recognized in Werts, "the Supreme Court stressed that 
an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 
an incorrect application of such law and a federal habeas 
court may not grant relief unless that court determines that 
a state court's incorrect or erroneous application of clearly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Factual findings of the state courts ar e presumed correct and it is 
the 
petitioner's burden to rebut the pr esumption by clear and convincing 
evidence. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1). Factualfindings are not at issue here. 
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established federal law was also unreasonable." Werts, 228 
F.3d at 196. Dunn challenges the state court's adjudication 
only under the latter prong of 2254(d)(1) --"unreasonable 
application" -- and our analysis will be r estricted to 
whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly 
established federal law. 
 
Before we can determine whether ther e was, in fact, an 
objectively unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law, we must identify the appropriate Supreme 
Court precedent. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413; see also 
Werts, 228 F.3d 178 (looking dir ectly to Supreme Court 
precedent on question of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim). The standards controlling adher ence to a plea 
agreement were set forth long ago by the Supreme Court in 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello, 
in exchange for the defendant's plea of guilty, the 
prosecutor agreed to make no sentencing r ecommendation. 
At sentencing, however, a new prosecutor (apparently 
ignorant of the first prosecutor's pr omise) recommended the 
maximum one-year sentence. Defense counsel objected to 
this recommendation and sought an adjour nment. The 
sentencing judge denied that request and stated that he 
was not at all influenced by the prosecutor's 
recommendation. The Court then imposed the maximum 
one-year, recommended term. On appeal, the conviction 
was affirmed. 
 
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and r emanded 
the case. The Court held that a guilty plea "must, of course, 
be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by 
promises, the essence of those promises must in some way 
be made known." Id. at 261-262. The Court further held 
that 
 
       [t]his phase of the process of criminal justice, and the 
       adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of 
       guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insur e the 
       defendant what is reasonably due in the 
       circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a 
       constant factor is that when a plea rests in any 
       significant degree on a promise or agr eement of the 
       prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
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       inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
       fulfilled. 
 
Id. at 262.3 The inadvertence of the breach, the Court held, 
did not "lessen its impact" and, even absent prejudice at 
sentencing, "the interests of justice and appropriate 
recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to 
promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be 
best served by remanding the case to the state courts for 
further consideration." Id. at 262-263. 
 
Thus, in Santobello, the Supreme Court clearly 
established that a prosecutor may enter into a plea 
agreement but, after doing so, must fulfill the promises 
contained therein. If the prosecutor fails to do so, whether 
purposefully or inadvertently, that breach must be 
remedied regardless of whether the defendant was 
prejudiced thereby.4 Under the limited review we are 
permitted under the AEDPA, we must decide whether the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement and whether the 
state court's adjudication to the contrary was an 
unreasonable application of Santobello. As we have already 




3. This Court has, of course, followed Santobello when called upon to 
review federal convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 
F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998)("Because the defendant, by entering into 
the plea, surrenders a number of her constitutional rights, `courts are 
compelled to scrutinize closely the promise made by the government in 
order to determine whether it has been performed.' ")(quoting United 
States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1991)); United States v. 
Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir . 1989)(recognizing that 
Santobello requires a prosecutor to keep his promises). 
 
4. In United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453 (1985) (per curiam), the 
Court held that, unless agreed to by the pr osecutor, an agreement to 
recommend a particular sentence under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure did not requir e the prosecutor to make his 
recommendation "enthusiastically" or explain the reasons for his 
recommendation. Id. at 455-456. The allegations here, however, focus 
not on a less than enthusiastic recommendation or a failure to explain 
the reasons for the recommendation, but on the fact that the promised 
recommendation was not forthcoming. 
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When a criminal defendant claims that the gover nment 
breached its plea agreement, the first step is to define what 
the government agreed to do. To appreciate the parameters 
of the Commonwealth's agreement, one must first 
understand the sentencing scheme in Pennsylvania. Unlike 
the federal sentencing scheme under which a defendant is 
sentenced to a fixed number of months in prison, in 
Pennsylvania, a defendant sentenced to confinement must 
be sentenced to both a minimum and maximum sentence. 
42 Pa.C.S.A. S 9756(a) and (b); Stewart v. Pennsylvania Bd. 
of Probation and Parole, 714 A.2d 502, 505-506 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1998) (describing the sentencing scheme as 
doling out indefinite/indeterminate sentences with a 
minimum and maximum term); Commonwealth v. Barziyk, 
629 A.2d 211, 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Commonwealth v. 
Cain, 637 A.2d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). To 
determine the minimum sentence, a court consults 
Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines, which include a 
matrix to determine a mitigated range, standar d range and 
aggravated range for the minimum sentence. Coss v. 
Lackawanna County District Atty., 94-CV-1481, 2000 WL 
1372871, *5, and n.6 (M.D. Pa., Aug. 23, 2000); 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 694 A.2d 353, 354 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997). The standard range designated in the sentencing 
guidelines is the standard range for the minimum sentence. 
204 Pa. Code S 303.11 and 303.16 (setting forth ranges of 
minimum sentences); Commonwealth v. Pittman, 737 A.2d 
272, 274 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (describing the guidelines as 
setting forth the "legal minimum period of incar ceration"); 
Adams, 694 A.2d at 354 (referring to the guidelines for the 
minimum sentence); Commonwealth v. Decker, 640 A.2d 
1321, 1323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). The maximum is set by 
statute and the minimum sentence cannot exceed half of 
the maximum sentence imposed. 42 Pa.C.S.A. S 9756(b); 
Cain, 637 A.2d at 659. The parties agree that the standard 
range for Dunn's minimum sentence was 36-60 months. 
 
Although the plea agreement in this case was not written, 
it was distilled many times; indeed, the Commonwealth 
does not dispute that it agreed to recommend that Dunn's 
minimum sentence be in the standard range of minimum 
sentences, i.e., 36-60 months. Over and over again, that 
obligation was articulated: "The Commonwealth is 
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recommending a minimum in this case on Count 1 within 
the standard range, standard guidelines range, but that is 
not binding on the Court"; "There will be a recommendation 
of a sentence of a minimum which would be in the 
standard range;" "The Commonwealth has r ecommended, 
but it is not binding on the Court, that on the char ge of 
aggravated assault that the sentence be -- that the 
minimum sentence be in the standard range of sentencing. 
. ."; "The Commonwealth also indicated that they would 
recommend a minimum sentence in the standar d range, 
although this was not binding on the Court. In this 
instance, the range would be 36 to 60 months. So it was 
the Commonwealth's recommendation that the minimum 
sentence be in that range, . . ." A462-464, A389. 
Parenthetically, and contrary to Dunn's contentions, the 
Commonwealth did not agree to recommend the minimum 
sentence of 36 months or a minimum sentence at the lower 
end of the standard range. 
 
Dunn argues that the prosecutor failed to recommend 
what she had agreed to recommend but, rather, asked the 
court to impose a "lengthy" -- a "considerable" -- sentence. 
He further argues that this breach was exacerbated by the 
remainder of the prosecutor's comments which made an 
end-run around her obligation with refer ence to the 
promised recommendation. In response, the 
Commonwealth argues there was no br each because 
"lengthy" described, albeit not explicitly, the agreed-upon 
minimum sentence of 36 to 60 months and the pr osecutor's 
request for such a sentence did not convey to the Court 
that she sought a longer sentence. 
 
We disagree. Dunn bargained for the recommendation of 
a minimum sentence within the standard range of 
minimums -- nothing more, nothing less. As a result, he 
could reasonably expect that the prosecutor would argue 
for a minimum sentence as low as three years or as high as 
five years. What he could not expect was that the 
prosecutor would seek a minimum sentence beyondfive 
years. This is precisely what the prosecutor did, sliding 
down a slippery slope on her way to denouncing her legal 
obligation. 
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Instead of recommending even a five year minimum term, 
the prosecutor chose to use the vague, yet loaded, words 
"lengthy term of incarceration" and"a penalty that's 
considerable" -- a term of imprisonment she described as 
necessary to get Dunn's attention. She did not qualify this 
request in any respect and did not even mention the words 
"minimum" or "standard range." Mor eover, a "lengthy term 
of incarceration" -- "a penalty that's considerable" -- could 
surely have meant something very differ ent from (and, from 
Dunn's point of view, much worse than) the pr omised 
recommendation of a minimum sentence of between 36 to 
60 months, particularly where Dunn was exposed to a 
sentence of ten to twenty years. Lest there be any doubt, 
the import of what the prosecutor was seeking was clear 
when she said: 
 
       I can't ask you to impose the maximum possible 
       penalty. That would go outside of what my initial 
       recommendation was. And I think if I would have a 
       chance to sit down and have a drink of water and calm 
       myself, maybe I would even think that to ask for the 
       absolute maximum is unjust. But I believe this was 
       reckless conduct. . . . 
 
A145. By referring to her obligation under the plea 
agreement as only her "initial recommendation;" expressing 
her personal reservations about that agr eement and asking 
for a "lengthy" -- a "considerable"-- sentence; and stating 
that if given more time to reflect she might think that the 
"absolute" maximum would be unjust, thus implying that 
at that point in time the maximum was just, the prosecutor 
unequivocally communicated to the Court that she 
disavowed her earlier recommendation and now believed, as 
Detective Schwartz had testified, that something up to the 
maximum sentence allowable by law would be an 
appropriate sentence. The totality of the pr osecutor's 
remarks compels the conclusion that her failur e to 
affirmatively recommend a minimum sentence within the 
standard range had but one purpose: to influence the Court 
to impose a minimum sentence far greater thanfive years. 
 
The fact that, at least as of the outset of the sentencing 
hearing, the Court was aware of what the pr osecutor was 
obliged to recommend does not excuse the Commonwealth's 
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failure to fulfill that obligation. W e can, of course, imagine 
sentencings at which articulating a recommended sentence 
in haec verba would be redundant or , for some other 
reason, unnecessary and, therefore, not required as long as 
it can fairly be said that the sentencing court had the 
recommendation before it when sentence was imposed. 
Here, however, it appears that what transpired at the 
sentencing hearing prompted the prosecutor's impassioned 
statement, a statement which not only did not articulate or 
even hint at the promised recommendation, but was 
inconsistent with that promised recommendation. 
 
Although Santobello did not establish a bright-line test by 
which to determine when a prosecutor has reneged on a 
plea agreement, the Court made clear that, at a minimum, 
when a prosecutor makes a promise which induced, at 
least in significant part, a guilty plea -- or , as here, a plea 
of nolo contendere -- the pr osecutor's promise must be 
fulfilled. Because no conclusion can be drawn other than 
that this prosecutor did not, in Santobello 's word, convey 
even the "essence" of that promise, she breached both the 
letter and the spirit of her agreement. W e conclude that the 
Superior Court's determination that the pr osecutor did not 
breach the plea agreement involved, in the words of the 
AEDPA, "an unreasonable application of[ ] clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 




Having found that the state court unreasonably applied 
Santobello, we must consider what, if any, r emedy is 
appropriate. The Commonwealth, rigid in its position that it 
did not breach the plea agreement, has not discussed the 
issue of remedy. For his part, Dunn argues that the 
harmless error rule does not apply and we are "duty 
bound" under Santobello to grant him r elief regardless of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that the Superior Court found that a sentence in the standard 
range of 36-60 months was "lengthy" and that, in any event, the 
prosecutor "qualified" her call for a lengthy term by indicating that her 
initial recommendation was "still intact." The prosecutor, of course, 
indicated no such thing. 
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whether the sentencing court was influenced by the 
Commonwealth's breach. We agree that Santobello requires 
relief, as does this Court's precedent. 
 
The Supreme Court made quite clear that it did not need 
to "reach the question of whether the sentencing judge 
would or would not have been influenced" by the terms of 
the plea agreement had the agreement not been breached. 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. Rather, the Court concluded 
that 
 
       the interests of justice and appropriate r ecognition of 
       the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises 
       made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best 
       served by remanding the case to the state courts for 
       further consideration. The ultimate relief to which 
       petitioner is entitled we leave to the discr etion of the 
       state court, which is in a better position to decide 
       whether the circumstances of this case r equire only 
       that there be specific performance of the agreement on 
       the plea, in which case petitioner should be 
       resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the 
       view of the state court, the circumstances r equire 
       granting the relief sought by petitioner , i.e., the 
       opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-263. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court's decision to remand the case despite the sentencing 
court's explicit statement that it had not been influenced by 
the prosecutor's recommendation leaves little room to argue 
that the harmless error rule applies. 
 
The rationale for this is evident. By entering into a plea 
agreement, a defendant voluntarily and knowingly 
surrenders a plethora of constitutional rights in exchange 
for a commitment by the prosecutor to do or not do certain 
things. When the prosecutor breaches that agreement, he 
or she violates the defendant's due process rights by 
implicating the consideration and voluntariness upon 
which that plea was based. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 
504, 509 (1984)("It follows that when the pr osecution 
breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea 
agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, 
and hence his conviction cannot stand: `[W]hen a plea rests 
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in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled.' ") (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262). Especially 
when the prosecutor's promise is not binding on the court, 
the defendant does not bargain for a specific sentence but 
for a lock on what the prosecutor can do and say at 
sentencing. That the sentencing court does not follow the 
prosecutor's lead is irrelevant. A defendant's constitutional 
rights are violated when a prosecutor r eneges on the 
consideration underlying the defendant's plea of guilty. 
United States v. Camarillo-Tello, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 6711 
(9th Cir., Jan. 3, 2001). 
 
Breach of a plea agreement by a pr osecutor also strikes 
at public confidence in the fair administration of justice 
and, in turn, the integrity of our criminal justice system in 
which a vast number of cases are resolved by plea 
agreement. United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 
594 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that this is a concern for federal 
prosecutions) (citing to United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 
426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972)); State of W est Virginia v. Palmer, 
524 S.E.2d 661, 665 (S. Ct. W. Va. 1999) (noting same 
concern with respect to state prosecutions). Thus, we have 
held that "the doctrine that the government must adhere to 
its bargain in the plea agreement is so fundamental that 
even though the government's breach is inadvertent and 
the breach probably did not influence the judge in the 
sentence imposed, due process and equity r equire that the 
sentence be vacated." United States v. Hayes , 946 F.2d 230, 
233 (3d Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 375 (although not all constitutional 
errors warrant issuance of the writ, "err ors that undermine 
confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state 
adjudication certainly justify the issuance of the federal 
writ."); United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 
(3d Cir. 1998) (breach of plea agr eement requires remedy 
regardless of harmless error rule). 
 
When we find, on review, that a federal pr osecutor has 
breached a plea agreement, we generally leave the remedy 
to the discretion of the district court. United States v. 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir . 1992) (noting general 
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rule but ordering resentencing because the defendant had 
already served a considerable portion of his sentence); 
United States v. Moschahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361, 1363 
(3d Cir. 1989) (regardless of whether the sentencing court 
was affected by the breach, the general rule requires 
sentence be vacated and the case remanded for 
consideration of proper remedy); United States v. Martin, 
788 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); see also United 
States v. Mondragon, 228 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding the "harmless error rule does not apply when the 
government breaches a plea agreement."); United States v. 
Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1992) (recognizing general 
rule under Santobello). 
 
It is equally appropriate when we find that a state 
prosecutor has breached a plea agr eement to refer the issue 
of remedy to the state court. Thus, this Court will not 
decide whether Dunn should be resentenced under the plea 
agreement or given the opportunity to withdraw his plea. 
Indeed, as the Santobello Court long ago observed, it is best 
left to the state court to decide what remedy is appropriate. 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263. That this case r eaches us 
under section 2254 also informs our decision to give the 
state court an opportunity to determine whether Dunn 
should be resentenced or permitted to go to trial. Coss v. 
Lackawanna County District Attorney, 204 F .3d 453 (3d 
Cir.) (en banc) (noting general rule of leaving proper remedy 




6. Before the state courts, Dunn sought the opportunity to withdraw his 
plea and proceed to trial. At oral argument before us, however, it was 
suggested that because he has served more thanfive years (the most 
severe minimum sentence under the agreed-upon standard range), we 
should resentence him to time served. Wholly aside from the legal 
implications of that suggestion, the circumstances of this case cry out 
for state court involvement. For example, contrary to Dunn's suggestion, 
we do not know whether the sentencing court would have imposed a 
minimum sentence not to exceed five years absent a breach. Nor can we 
find that Dunn would have been released upon completing whatever 
minimum term might have been imposed because, under Pennsylvania 
law, a defendant who completes his or her minimum term is entitled 
only to be considered for parole. Accor dingly, we decline Dunn's 
invitation to resentence him to time served, although the state court may 
certainly deem it appropriate to do so. Mor eover, given that Dunn has 
vacillated on the relief he seeks, remand will give him an opportunity to 
make an informed, counseled request. 
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The dissent concludes, based solely on principles of 
comity and federalism, that the harmless err or rule applies 
to Santobello violations; indeed, the dissent seemingly 
suggests, without pausing to distinguish between 
constitutional violations which are trial err ors and those 
which are structural defects, that the har mless error rule 
applies across the board on habeas r eview. We are not 
nearly as sure as the dissent that the har mless error rule 
applies where a prosecutor has broken a promise made in 
exchange for the agreement to plead guilty and has thereby 
undercut the basis on which the defendant waived the host 
of constitutional rights implicit in his or her plea, and we 
are certainly sure that the harmless error rule does not 
apply across the board. 
 
The Supreme Court and this Court have, on dir ect 
appeal, regularly treated Santobello  errors as akin to 
structural defects not susceptible of harmless error 
analysis. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-263 (r emanding even 
though sentencing court stated it was not influenced by the 
erroneous recommendation); Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236 
(citing general rule that remand is necessary once 
Santobello error is found); Badaracco , 954 F.2d at 941 
(same); Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233 (same). Nothing in recent 
Supreme Court caselaw, or in cases decided by this Court, 
has called this conclusion into question on dir ect or habeas 
review; the Commonwealth has not questioned that 
conclusion here; and the parties have not raised, much less 
briefed, the issue. Moreover, we do not worry, as the 
dissent seems to worry, that our conclusion vis-a-vis a 
Santobello violation would somehow impact much less set 
a far-reaching precedent for all guilty pleas, or "wall off over 
ninety percent of state criminal convictions fr om harmless- 
error analysis," Dissent at 36; indeed, we do not take issue 
with the dissent's conclusion that the vast majority of 
errors alleged in the guilty plea process would be subject to 
the harmless error rule. In any event, we need not reach 
the issue, if issue it be, of whether a Santobello violation is 
a structural or trial error for even if har mless error would 
apply to a Santobello violation, we would not find the error 
harmless here where, we note, the pr osecutor did much 
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more than simply, as the dissent suggests, call for a 
"lengthy" sentence.7 
 
One final note. We indicated above both our belief that 
the prosecutor's comments were incited by Dunn's refusal 
to accept responsibility for his actions and our appreciation 
of the difficulties this sentencing presented. Nonetheless, 
we reiterate that Santobello does not allow a prosecutor to 
unilaterally repudiate his or her promises because honoring 




For the reasons stated above, we will r everse the 
judgment of the District Court denying the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, and remand with instructions that it 
issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Dunn's r elease if the 




7. The dissent speculates that the reason Dunn did not pursue a direct 
appeal was because, if he were to have pr evailed on appeal such that his 
plea was vacated, he could have been exposed to less favorable plea 
terms or even potential homicide charges. From this, the dissent 
concludes that we are "rewarding" Dunn's "tactical use of federal habeas 
relief." Dissent at 33. But as the various opinions in Santobello 
underscore, Dunn could have sought specific performance of the 
agreement instead of vacation of his plea with his preference, as Justice 
Douglas put it, accorded "considerable, if not controlling, weight." 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267. We see no"tactical" advantage here from 
having waited; indeed, given the result we r each, there may well have 
been a disadvantage. 
 
                                25 
  
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting : 
 
John Dunn repeatedly struck his two-month old son 
causing massive, permanent brain damage. Despite the 
child's crying and the struggling noises he made 
throughout the remainder of the day, Dunn did nothing to 
seek medical care; and when his wife retur ned home from 
work around 5:30 p.m., and insisted on calling a doctor, 
Dunn vehemently objected and pitched a bottle thr ough a 
window, shattering it. Not until his wife thr eatened to call 
a lawyer did he agree to drive her and the child to the 
doctor. Once prosecuted, Dunn decided to plead nolo 
contendere to one count of aggravated assault and one 
count of endangerment of the welfare of a child. In return 
for his plea the state prosecutor dropped two other charges, 
agreed to five years of probation for the charge of 
endangering the welfare of a child, and pr omised to 
recommend a minimum sentence in the standar d range for 
the charge of aggravated assault. 
 
Granting Dunn habeas relief, the majority holds that the 
state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court 
precedent in evaluating the prosecutor's compliance with 
the plea agreement at sentencing. The majority also 
suggests that harmless-error analysis does not apply to 
habeas review of an alleged breach of a plea agreement. 
 
I respectfully disagree with both conclusions, and believe 
that the majority's opinion may have far-r eaching 
consequences. According to data collected by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, pleas accounted for 94.6% 
of all federal convictions in fiscal year 1999, 93.6% 
in 1998, 93.2% in 1997, 91.7% in 1996, and 91.9% 
in 1995. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Datafile, 
http://www.ussc.gov. And similar figures undoubtedly 
apply to state convictions. One recent study, for example, 
found that less than 5% of state felony criminal cases were 
disposed of through jury trial. Jeffr ey Abramson, We, The 
Jury 252 (2000). What this data demonstrates is that a 
habeas decision affecting pleas and sentencing will have 
vastly greater impact than any influencing pr ocedure at 
trial. 
 




The breach of the plea agreement occurr ed, according to 
the majority, when the prosecutor made a r ecommendation 
for the charge of aggravated assault. T o evaluate what the 
prosecutor promised for that count, it is important to 
understand that in Pennsylvania a convicted defendant 
receives a minimum and a maximum sentence. See Majority 
Op. at 17 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. S 9756(a) and (b); Stewart v. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Par ole, 714 A.2d 502, 
505-06 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)). The minimum sentence is 
usually established by applying sentencing guidelines, 
which allow the sentencing judge to select the defendant's 
minimum sentence from one of three ranges--a mitigated, 
standard, or aggravated range. A defendant's maximum 
sentence, by contrast, is limited only by the statutory 
maximum. 
 
In Dunn's case the standard range for the minimum 
sentence was 36-to-60 months, while the statutory 
maximum sentence was 20 years. On appeal Dunn'sfirst 
argument is that what the prosecutor actually agreed to do 
was recommend a single sentence at the bottom end of the 
standard range, i.e., the lowest or minimum sentence in the 
standard range, which is a sentence of 36 months. But as 
the majority concludes, this argument r ests on an incorrect 
interpretation of the plea agreement. Defendants do not 
receive a single determinate sentence under Pennsylvania 
law, and it is clear from the recor d that all that the 
prosecutor agreed to do was "recommend a minimum 
sentence in the standard range." App. at 87. What Dunn's 
argument neglects is that the term "minimum" does not 
refer to the low end of the standard range but to the first 
part of the defendant's sentence--the minimum sentence. 
In other words, if the prosecutor had r ecommended a 
particular minimum sentence near the top of the standard 
range, that would have been entirely consistent with the 
plea agreement. 
 
Against this legal background we must evaluate Dunn's 
second objection, the argument that the majority accepts. 
Dunn maintains that the prosecutor impr operly requested 
a "lengthy term of incarceration" or "a penalty that's 
considerable." App. at 145-46. Like the pr osecutor, the 
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state courts, and the District Court, I believe that these 
remarks were consistent with the plea agr eement. The 
majority acknowledges that the plea agreement did not 
require the prosecutor to advocate for leniency within the 
standard range, and there is no clearly established 
Supreme Court precedent for finding that the prosecutor 
had an implied duty to do so. Cf. United States v. 
Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 105 S.Ct. 2103 (1985) (per 
curiam) (rejecting that a plea agreement included an 
implied duty to make a recommendation enthusiastically). 
The prosecutor was entitled to urge, even vigorously, that 
the judge sentence at the high end of the range, and as 
both Dunn and the majority implicitly recognize, nothing 
limited the prosecutor from presenting compelling evidence 
to convince the judge to do so. The majority opinion also 
makes clear that the sentencing judge and the pr osecutor 
repeatedly reviewed the prosecutor's obligation to 
recommend that the minimum sentence fall in the standard 
range, and the sentencing judge understood this point. 
Moreover, the plea agreement imposed no limitation at all 
about the maximum sentence. 
 
When the state trial judge (the same judge as it happens 
who sentenced Dunn) rejected Dunn's petition for post- 
conviction collateral relief, the judge wr ote that the 
prosecutor's request for a "lengthy" sentence was 
"consistent with the plea agreement in that the standard 
range of sentencing for Defendant's aggravated assault 
charge extended to a minimum of five (5) years of 
incarceration." App. at 300. The state inter mediate 
appellate court similarly reasoned that the pr osecutor's 
remarks were consistent with the plea agr eement because 
the standard sentence range of three-to-five years for the 
minimum sentence "can be viewed as `lengthy' in and of 
itself." App. at 273. Expanding on this r easoning, the 
District Court noted in denying Dunn's habeas petition that 
in 1993, the year Dunn was sentenced, the mean minimum 
sentence in Pennsylvania for aggravated assault was 13.2 
months and the mean maximum was 35.6 months. Thus, 
any minimum sentence in the standard range of 36-to-60 
months, the District Court reasoned, "would, against these 
averages, be `lengthy.' " App. at 51 n.1. 
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Because Dunn's petition is governed by the 1996 AEDPA 
amendments to the federal habeas statute, we do not 
review a state court's legal determinations under a de novo 
standard. See Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 402-13, 
120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 
178, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2000). Federal courts do not exercise 
the same general supervisory powers over state courts that 
federal appellate courts do over federal district courts. We 
cannot grant habeas relief unless the state-court decision is 
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d)(1). 
 
In Williams the Supreme Court devised separate legal 
standards for the "contrary to" and "unreasonable 
application of " clauses. The majority implies that it is 
confining itself to the "unreasonable application" standard 
because Dunn only challenged the state-court decision 
under that provision. See Majority Op. at 15. But in fact, 
Dunn's brief makes no such distinction between the two 
standards and instead states, "Whether the government 
violated the plea agreement is a question of law and review 
is plenary." Appellant's brief at 22. 
 
The deferential "unreasonable application" standard 
controls "if the state court identifies the correct governing 
legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but 
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state 
prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. at 
1520. In some cases there may be some doubt about 
whether the "contrary to" or "unreasonable application" 
clause applies, see, e.g., Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 
F.3d 226, 242 (3d Cir. 2000), but her e the state courts 
understood that a prosecutor is obliged to adhere to 
promises in a plea agreement. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 
U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547 (1984); Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971). Because the 
state courts understood the controlling legal rule and the 
only question is whether the courts correctly applied that 
rule to these facts, there is no doubt that the"unreasonable 
application standard" applies. "[A] run-of-the-mill state- 
court decision applying the correct legal rule from our cases 
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to the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit comfortably 
within S 2254(d)(1)'s `contrary to' clause." Williams, 529 
U.S. at 406, 120 S.Ct. at 1520. 
 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that "an 
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law." Williams, 529 U.S. at 
412, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (emphasis in original). The majority 
must conclude, therefore, that even though the prosecutor 
was entitled to advocate against leniency, and even though 
the prosecutor and the state judge had r epeatedly reviewed 
and affirmed the exact requirements of the plea agreement, 
the state courts were not merely incorr ect in finding that 
the term "lengthy" could refer to the top of the standard 
range, they were objectively unreasonable. Given the 
context of this case and that the term "lengthy" is relative, 
I cannot agree. Three hours, for example, is a long time for 
a movie but not for the flu. Likewise, just as we could 
properly say that a person had a "lengthy" hospital stay 
when he stayed ten out of a possible one-to-ten days, so too 
for speaking of the lengthy end of a range of 36-to-60 
months of prison. Even in absolute terms, ther e is nothing 
improper about calling a five-year sentence"lengthy." 
 
The prosecutor's request for a lengthy sentence did 
telegraph her desire that the court not be lenient, but what 
the majority ignores in complaining about this effect is that 
under the terms of the plea agreement she was legitimately 
entitled to say that she thought the judge should not be 
lenient either within the standard range or in determining 




The majority also maintains that harmless-err or doctrine 
does not apply to a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement 
when a state prisoner brings a habeas petition. The central 
problem with the majority's analysis is that it fails to 
distinguish the doctrine's application on dir ect review from 
that on habeas. In 1993 the Supreme Court held that there 
is a distinct harmless-error standar d that applies in federal 
habeas cases and imposes a "less onerous" burden for 
upholding the state conviction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
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U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710,1722 (1993). And that lower 
standard applies regardless of whether the state court 
conducted a harmless-error review. Hassine v. Zimmerman, 
160 F.3d 941, 950-53 (3d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases).1 
 
The Supreme Court noted in Brecht  that there are 
numerous instances where the Court distinguishes between 
the relief available on direct review and that for habeas. For 
example, "Although new rules always have r etroactive 
application to criminal cases on direct r eview, we have held 
that they seldom have retroactive application to criminal 
cases on federal habeas." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 634, 113 S.Ct. 
at 1720 (citations omitted). Another example is that the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule cannot be invoked 
in habeas. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037 
(1976). Similarly, defendants have a right to counsel for 
direct appeals, Douglas v. California , 372 U.S. 353, 355, 83 
S.Ct. 814, 815 (1963), but not for collateral attacks on the 
conviction. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56, 
107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987). After noting the many ways 
that relief differs under habeas--dif ferences that have only 
expanded since Brecht with the passage of the AEDPA--the 
Supreme Court explained: "The reason most frequently 
advanced in our cases for distinguishing between dir ect 
and collateral review is the State's inter est in the finality of 
convictions that have survived direct r eview within the state 
court system. We have also spoke of comity and federalism 
. . . . `Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate 
both the States' sovereign power to punish of fenders and 
their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.' " 
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635, 113 S.Ct. at 1720. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority states that the parties "have not raised, much less 
briefed the issue" of harmless error . Majority Op. at 24. But the 
Commonwealth did maintain at oral argument that any putative error 
was harmless, and in any event we have discr etion to consider harmless 
error sua sponte. See, e.g., United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 213 
(3d Cir. 2000); United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 
1997); United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir. 1997); 
Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1492 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 704 n.9 (10th Cir. 1992); Lufkins v. 
Leapley, 965 F.2d 1477, 1481 (8th Cir . 1992); United States v. Pryce, 938 
F.2d 1343, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 
225, 227 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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When a constitutional challenge is focused on a state 
court's evaluation of sentencing and the alleged err or is 
harmless, these concerns with federalism and comity 
should be at their height. Habeas corpus, the Supr eme 
Court has repeatedly said, is an "extraor dinary remedy" 
reserved for defendants who were "grievously wronged" by 
the criminal proceedings. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 
141, 146, 119 S.Ct. 500, 503 (1998) (per curiam) (quoting 
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633-34, 113 S.Ct. at 1719; Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391, 440-41, 83 S.Ct. 822, 850 (1963)). The 
Supreme Court has explained that a federal court 
disregards these concerns with federalism and comity when 
it sets aside a state-court sentence without deter mining 
that the error had a "substantial and injurious effect." 
Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146, 119 S.Ct. at 503. "The social 
costs of retrial or resentencing ar e significant, and the 
attendant difficulties are acute . . . wher e the original 
sentencing hearing took place . . . [long ago]. The State is 
not to be put to this arduous task based on mer e 
speculation that the defendant was prejudiced. . . ." Id. 
(citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. at 1721). 
 
Relief in this case is unwarranted. The state courts were 
reasonable to find that the prosecutor's use of the term 
"lengthy" was consistent with the plea agr eement given that 
the prosecutor retained the right to advocate for the top 
end of the standard range; the state sentencing judge made 
abundantly clear that he understood the limitations 
included in the plea agreement; and when sentencing Dunn 
to a minimum sentence of seven-and-a-half years and a 
maximum sentence of twenty years, the judge str essed a 
factor not emphasized by the prosecutor . The judge 
explained that he was "extremely troubled" by the fact that 
Dunn did nothing to seek medical advice throughout the 
day, despite the obvious signs of injury to his infant son. 
App. at 452. Worse, Dunn threatened his wife by breaking 
a window when she attempted to seek medical advice and 
would not drive her and the child to a doctor until she said 
she would call a lawyer. As the majority opinion details, the 
evidence at sentencing against Dunn was overwhelming. 
Dunn's wife gave the following description of her son's 
condition at the sentencing hearing: 
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       He vomits all the time, he's in tremendous pain, he has 
       to take a lot of medications. It's usually accompanied 
       with vomiting. It can damage his liver if it's not 
       monitored properly. He constantly has to have his 
       blood level drawn. He's constantly--he has mucous 
       and he can't clear his own mucous. He is in danger of 
       aspirating if he inhales it all back into his lungs, which 
       can cause pneumonia. 
 
App. at 394. She added that her son was fed thr ough a 
tube into his stomach, would cry for three hours at a time, 
and had no motor skills at fifteen months, the infant's age 
at sentencing. No one disputed that the child's life 
expectancy was no more than two-to-seven years, and that 
he would require nearly constant medical care during that 
time. It also should be emphasized that the sour ce of harm 
the majority must rely upon is the differ ence in effect 
between what they say was impermissible--the prosecutor's 
use of the terms "lengthy" and "considerable"--and the 
word choice that undeniably would have been per missible-- 
a request by the prosecution for the highest minimum 
sentence in the standard range. 
 
The majority's analysis is also rewarding exactly the sort 
of tactical use of federal habeas relief that the Supreme 
Court has sought to prevent. See, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S. at 
635, 113 S.Ct. at 1720-21 (citing Engle v. Isaac , 456 U.S. 
107, 127, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1571 (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 455 
U.S. 509, 547, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1218 (1982)). At Dunn's 
state post-conviction hearing, the trial judge engaged in the 
following colloquy with the lawyer who repr esented Dunn at 
the original plea and sentencing hearings: 
 
       The Court: There had been plea negotiations over 
       some period of time; is that correct? 
 
       Mr. Barr: Absolutely. 
 
       The Court: And the plea negotiations or the plea that 
       was previously offered, were there better 
       terms in your estimation? 
 
       Mr. Barr: Yes. The longer this case went on, the 
       worse the terms became because the 
       child's condition became worse. 
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       The Court: I see. In other words--the condition of that 
       child was what, Mr. Barr? 
 
       Mr. Barr: Very, very serious. He had very serious 
       brain injury. 
 
App. at 332-33. In his findings of fact, the trial judge 
concluded that after Dunn was charged, he"was open to 
the possibility of a guilty plea and plea negotiations were 
conducted over a lengthy period of time. The ter ms of the 
agreement offered by the Commonwealth, however, became 
less attractive as the child's conditioned [sic] worsened. 
Attorney Barr believed that a plea was in Defendant's best 
interest as Defendant could face homicide char ges if the 
child were to die." App. at 296-97. It is a fair inference that 
the reason Dunn declined to file a dir ect appeal is that even 
if the appellate court agreed there had been a breach of the 
plea agreement (and later events show that the court 
thought there was no breach), the chance that the plea 
would have been vacated exposed Dunn to potential 
homicide charges at worst, and less favorable plea terms at 
best. 
 
And contrary to the majority's suggestion in footnote 7, 
Dunn could not have been sure that if he appealed and the 
child died, he would be able to avoid having his plea 
vacated, for Santobello does not give a criminal defendant 
the right to choose between resentencing or having the plea 
vacated. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion concluded, 
"The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave 
to the discretion of the state court. . . ." Santobello, 404 
U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. 499. The separate opinions in 
Santobello do not provide authority otherwise. Neither 
Justice Douglas's opinion, which no other Justice joined, 
nor Justice Marshall's opinion, which attracted two other 
votes, provides a basis for rejecting the majority opinion's 
rule that the lower court retains discr etion about the choice 
of relief. 
 
The majority's reason for concluding that har mless error 
does not apply is that in Santobello--a direct-review case-- 
the Supreme Court said that it would remand to the state 
courts even though the state sentencing judge said that the 
prosecutor's breach of the plea agr eement did not affect the 
 
                                34 
  
sentence he imposed. Relying exclusively on this aspect of 
Santobello this circuit has continued to say in cases 
involving direct review that harmless error does not apply 
to a prosecutor's breach of a plea agr eement. See United 
States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing United States v. Hayes, 946 F .2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citing Santobello)). 
 
We have never, however, addr essed whether Santobello's 
conclusion about harmless error should be expanded to 
apply in habeas and in the teeth of the Supr eme Court's 
more recent decision, Brecht . Indeed, in the thirty years 
since Santobello was decided, there has been an avalanche 
of cases expanding harmless-error analysis to 
constitutional errors occurring during all phases of criminal 
trials and sentencing. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (1999) (jury instruction's omission 
of materiality requirement, an offense element, was 
harmless error); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 111 S.Ct. 
1884 (1991) (harmless error applied to mandatory 
rebuttable presumption in jury instructions); Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 307, 306-09, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263- 
64 (1991) (harmless error applied to coer ced confessions 
that were admitted into evidence); Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738, 752-54, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1450-51 (1990) 
(applying harmless error to unconstitutionally overbroad 
jury instructions at the sentencing stage of a capital case); 
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792 (1988) 
(admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital 
case in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); 
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 
2421 (1989) (jury instructions containing an err oneous 
conclusive presumption); Pope v. Illinois , 481 U.S. 497, 
501-504, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23 (1987) (jury instruction 
misstating an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 
U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986) (jury instructions 
containing erroneous rebuttable pr esumption); Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2147 (1986) 
(erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony about the 
circumstances of his confession); Delawar e v. Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (1986) (unconstitutional 
restriction on defendant's right to cross-examine a witness); 
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18, and n.2, 104 S.Ct. 
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453, 454-55, and n.2 (1983) (denial of defendant's right to 
be present at trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 
103 S.Ct. 1974 (1983) (unconstitutional comment on 
defendant's silence at trial in violation of Fifth Amendment); 
Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049 (1982) 
(unconstitutional statute forbidding trial court fr om giving 
jury instruction on lesser included offense in a capital 
case); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 99 S.Ct. 2088 
(1979) (failure to instruct jury on presumption of 
innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232, 98 S.Ct. 
458, 466 (1977) (evidence admitted in violation of Sixth 
Amendment); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231- 
32, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570-71 (1973) (admission of out-of- 
court statement of nontestifying codefendant in violation of 
Sixth Amendment); Milton v. Wainwright , 407 U.S. 371, 92 
S.Ct. 2174 (1972) (confession unconstitutionally obtained). 
 
The majority implies that harmless-err or analysis should 
not apply to a breach of a plea agreement because, the 
majority asserts, such a violation is structural err or. The 
majority is correct that the "Kotteakos  standard [invoked in 
Brecht] did not apply to `structural defects in the 
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 
`harmless-error' standards.' " California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 
5, 117 S.Ct. 337, 338 (1996) (per curiam) (quoting Brecht, 
507 U.S. at 629, 113 S.Ct. at 1717). But the tr ouble with 
the majority's argument is that the Supr eme Court has 
never said violations of Santobello ar e structural error, and 
there is a "strong presumption" against finding that a given 
type of constitutional violation is structural. Rose v. Clark, 
478 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. at 3106. Twice in r ecent years 
the Supreme Court has listed the "very limited class of 
cases" where the error is deemed structural, see Neder, 527 
U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. at 1833; Johnson v. United States, 520 
U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997), and pointedly 
a breach of a plea agreement in violation of Santobello was 
not included. 
 
Nor is it plausible that the Supreme Court would now 
decide to expand the class of structural err ors, and wall off 
over ninety percent of state criminal convictions from 
harmless-error analysis on habeas r eview, particularly 
since pleas are not likely to concern cases involving 
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innocent defendants. The majority retorts that no far- 
reaching precedent is at stake because state prisoners who 
challenge their guilty pleas may face harmless error for 
claims other than an alleged breach of a plea agreement. 
But what viable constitutional claims besides br each of a 
plea agreement are available to a habeas petitioner who 
pleaded guilty in state court? In any event, the majority 
cannot obscure the impact of barring har mless-error 
analysis in habeas review of plea agreements by pointing 
out that the doctrine might apply to some other claims. The 
fact remains that over ninety percent of defendants enter 
guilty pleas, and as a result barring har mless-error 
analysis from habeas review of alleged br eaches of plea 
agreements will have a much bigger impact than barring 
harmless-error analysis from any rule affecting trials. 
 
Removing breaches of plea agreements fr om harmless 
error may make sense on direct review, where the relevant 
evidence of the defendant's guilt has not gr own as stale, 
and where comity and federalism are not at stake, but not 
so for habeas review. By the time a federal court considers 
a habeas petition, victims who want to get on with their 
lives may no longer be willing to testify at sentencing, and 
if the plea is vacated, evidence may have disappear ed or 
grown stale, making it harder for the state to prove what 
was once an easy case. And regardless of whether the plea 
is vacated or resentencing ordered, granting relief forces a 
direct intrusion on state courts' authority even though the 
outcome of the state proceeding was not af fected. 
 
Finality serves important interests and is most 
compelling when there was no harm fr om the alleged error. 
The majority's opinion reaches the wrong r esult in this case 
and, given the vast number of pleas in state court, creates 
precedent that will multiply that error many times in future 
cases. I dissent. 
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